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Consolidating Power: Technology, 
Ideology, and Philadelphia’s Growth 
in the Early Republic 
 
 
AN DR EW M. SCH OC KE T 
 
 
 
Few  contemporary American issues are more  controversial than the 
powerful role  of corporations (both  business and  municipal) in soci- 
ety,  politics, and  the  economy. Yet strikingly, few scholars have  in- 
vestigated the  deepest historical roots  of American corporate power. 
Most  historians who  have  considered this  issue  have  focused their 
research on  the  Gilded Age  and  beyond because of the  post–Civil 
War rise of industrial capitalism, the increased prominence of corpo- 
rations on  the  national scene, and  the  dramatic growth of city  gov- 
ernments in the  context of late  nineteenth-century  large-scale immi- 
gration and  the  provision of citywide service and  transportation 
infrastructure.1  Consequently, they  have  minimized the  origins of 
American corporate power in the first  decades of the republic, a cru- 
cial issue  in the development of American business, American cities, 
and  the  nation. 
In this  dissertation I examine the  ways  moneyed Philadelphians 
invented corporate power in America during the  first  half-century of 
the  federal republic, specifically focusing on  business corporations 
such as  canal companies and  banks and  on  a  public corporation, 
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Philadelphia’s municipal  government. Using   evidence from  com- 
pany and  municipal records and  publications, the private papers and 
correspondence of  corporate officers, newspapers, pamphlets, and 
legislative acts  and  proceedings, I identify the  people and  the  tech- 
nological and  financial processes that  contributed to  the  establish- 
ment and  entrenchment of corporate economic and  political power. 
I argue that  corporate leaders, responding to the demands of the Phil- 
adelphia region, used technology, ideology, and  finance to create a 
social space, neither public nor private, that  I have  called the “corpo- 
rate  sphere.” 
Early  republican Philadelphia provides the  perfect site  for  such 
inquiries into  the role of corporations in American life. After the 
American Revolution, Philadelphia-area residents demanded a better 
supply of  fresh  water, more  efficient transportation to  and  from  a 
developing hinterland, increased opportunities for cash  and  credit, 
and  stable investments. Accordingly, in the  1780s  and  1790s  promi- 
nent Philadelphians turned to a proven British institutional structure 
that  could provide the framework to address these demands: the cor- 
poration. Leaders of business corporations and  the  city  corporation 
of Philadelphia—the Quaker City’s municipal government—pio- 
neered the legal,  financial, technological, ideological, and  social 
foundations for  the  spectacular rise  of corporate power during the 
second half  of the  nineteenth century. The  city  was  home to Ameri- 
ca’s first incorporated bank  (the Bank of North America) and  the first 
and  second Bank  of the  United States, and  was  becoming a banking 
center for the  entire Delaware Valley,  as well  as the  Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania. Philadelphians founded America’s first  successful 
turnpike corporation, its first  fire insurance corporations, many pio- 
neering marine insurance corporations, and  one of its first life insur- 
ance  corporations. They  formed some  of the nation’s most  prominent 
internal navigation companies. These companies were  testing grounds 
for later  corporations such as the Pennsylvania Rail Road,  which be- 
came  the  quintessential (and  largest)   American corporation in  the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century. In addition, the construction 
and  maintenance of the  country’s first  major  municipal waterworks 
system, first  at Centre  Square and  then at Fairmount, facilitated the 
financial and  administrative growth of the city corporation and  served 
as a model for other American cities. 
Many  late eighteenth-century Americans were  confident that  their 
revolution would result in  increased political and  economic oppor- 
tunity for the  many while breaking the  influence of local  elites. Two 
central issues in the  study of the  early  republic have  been  the  inten- 
sification of market participation—the “market revolution”—and the 
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decline of elite  authority in both  social  and  political terms.2 The  early 
republic witnessed a diffusion of local  political and  social power, as 
well  as  great  consolidations of economic and  political strength by 
holders of great  amounts of capital. I argue  that  business corporations 
and  large  municipal  corporations formed a  crucial connection  be- 
tween these phenomena by facilitating centralization in  some  cases 
and  diffusion in others. 
In the  Philadelphia region during the  first  third of the  nineteenth 
century, new  physical and  financial infrastructures allowed many 
people to enter the market far more  actively than before.  The Schuyl- 
kill  navigation, owned and  run  by  the  Schuylkill  Navigation Com- 
pany, made the river  passable by boat from the  Schuylkill anthracite 
fields to the  wharves of Philadelphia, and  by doing so led  to the 
agricultural  and   industrial  development of  the   entire  Schuylkill 
River Valley.  The Lehigh Coal and  Navigation Company soon  did  the 
same  for  the  Lehigh River.  The  Philadelphia waterworks provided 
not  only   safe  drinking water but  also  water for  brewers, tanners, 
soapboilers, inns, and  other businesses. Financial institutions such 
as the  Farmers and  Mechanics Bank,  the  Bank  of Pennsylvania, the 
Mutual Assurance Company for Insuring Houses from  Loss by Fire, 
and   the   Philadelphia  Contributionship for  Insuring  Houses  from 
Loss by Fire  made capital available for a wide variety of small-  and 
large-scale investments. At the  same  time,  the  increasing concentra- 
tion  of ownership and  control of these projects allowed a small mi- 
nority to exert  increased economic and  eventually political influence 
over  the  great  number who  used them. 
The  technologies used by  business and  municipal corporations 
exemplify what I call  “nexus technologies,” so  labeled because of 
their centrality to mass-market economic activity. Early  nineteenth- 
century corporate boards and  municipal councils manipulated nexus 
technologies and  others’ dependence on those technologies for mar- 
ket  participation in  order to  consolidate capital and   to  break   the 
power of local  elites, setting both  centripetal and  centrifugal forces 
in  motion. Thus, the  centralization of  capital and  political power 
and  the  diffusion of local  power were  not  in  any  way  antithetical: 
rather these developments were  the  necessarily interrelated results 
 
 
2.  See Paul  Gilje, ed.,  Wages  of Independence: Capitalism in the  Early Ameri- 
can  Republic (Madison, Wisc.,  1997);  Charles Sellers, The  Market  Revolution: 
Jacksonian America, 1815–1846 (New York, 1991); Alan  Taylor, William Cooper’s 
Town:   Power  and   Persuasion on  the  Frontier   of  the  Early  American Republic 
(New York, 1995); Harry  L. Watson, Liberty  and  Power: The  Politics of Jacksonian 
America (New  York,  1990);  and  Gordon Wood,  The  Radicalism of the  American 
Revolution (New  York, 1992). 
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of the ways  that  early  nineteenth-century Americans exploited nexus 
technologies. 
Nexus technologies had  great potential for extending power across 
vast  distances. Eighteenth-century American relations were  inher- 
ently local  and  personal, based on the extension of family credit and 
constant  reinforcement through face-to-face encounters—for exam- 
ple,  in churches, on  court days,  at militia musters, and  during elec- 
tion  campaigns. This  personal touch made such influence difficult to 
project over  space, but  controllers of  nexus technology could cast 
their shadows as far as their technologies would reach. The  Schuyl- 
kill  Navigation Company’s board of managers made decisions con- 
cerning capacity and  shipping rates  that  affected thousands of peo- 
ple living within 20 miles of their navigation, an area of 2,000 square 
miles, for  the  Schuylkill was  now  the  local  connection to  markets 
regional and  beyond. The  Watering Committee, the  subcommittee of 
the  Philadelphia city  corporation that  oversaw the  Philadelphia 
waterworks, enacted taxes  and  regulations enforced not  only  within 
the city but  also throughout the surrounding suburbs. Banks’ dis- 
counting policies had  broad ramifications for regional money supply. 
More  subtly and  more  profoundly, controllers of nexus technologies 
exploited them to create a new  kind of power. The  employment  of 
nexus technologies created new  dependencies among  their custom- 
ers that  did  not  rely  on face-to-face contact. At the  same  time,  thou- 
sands of  individuals, indeed entire communities, used the  canals, 
the  waterworks, and  capital loans to increase their market participa- 
tion,  bypassing local  patrons to  do  so.  They  now  depended on  the 
continued operation of the  infrastructure to protect their newfound 
opportunities. Thus, they  discovered themselves in  an  uneasy alli- 
ance  with the controllers of nexus technologies, even  as local  patrons 
saw  their clients and  clout slip  away. 
Corporate leaders also pioneered new  financial methods to further 
their goals.  In  1790  Philadelphia had  inadequate transportation to 
its  growing hinterland, no  centralized water supply system, and  no 
institutional methods for financing the necessary improvements. De- 
spite demanding these services, the public was unwilling to pay cash 
up   front   for  expensive  technologies  that   fostered  Philadelphia’s 
growth but wanted to reap  the  rewards of greater economic opportu- 
nities. Taxpayers wanted fresh  water and  better transportation with- 
out  substantially higher taxes.  Accordingly, through the  clever use 
of a sinking fund supported by bond issues, the  city  corporation  of- 
ficers  found a way  to eliminate risk  for investors. By budgeting for 
interest payments rather than for the  actual capital expenses of the 
waterworks, the  corporation insulated financial decisions from  the 
political process. Internal improvement companies did  the  same  by 
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offering   interest-bearing  mortgages to  big  investors. Banks,   mean- 
while, served as  investments so  safe  that  investors gave  managers 
great  freedom to pursue their own  ends. The  public reaped the  im- 
mediate benefits of these investments, but  later  paid dearly in  tolls 
and  water rents and  even  more  in lost  control over  some  of the  most 
important institutions governing the  city’s  economic future. Corpo- 
rate leaders pioneered financial methods that  allowed them to amass 
capital while shielding their ability to control it. 
These corporate leaders understood, however, that  they  could not 
operate in a complete political vacuum. They  needed legal  sanction 
from  the  state  government for  their charters and  often  lobbied for 
laws  that  benefited their operations at the expense of other economic 
actors. When they  did  enter public debate, they  manipulated the  re- 
publican and  libertarian strains of early  republic rhetoric. On the one 
hand, corporate leaders pointed out  that  their ventures served the 
greater community: that  the  banks, insurance companies, and  inter- 
nal  improvements they   administered were   in  the  public interest. 
Thus, they  appealed to a communitarian sense of the  general public 
interest in their requests for laws  that  gave the  corporations leverage 
against other economic interests that  ostensibly were  less  central to 
the common weal.  On the  other hand, when their motives were  called 
into  question, corporate boosters argued that  corporations, too,  had 
an  interest, and  that  the  pursuit of that  interest was  as legitimate as 
anyone else’s,  reflecting a libertarian ethos. By claiming to represent 
the  public as well  as themselves, corporate leaders used seemingly 
contradictory terms to  buttress the  legitimacy of their projects and 
actions; this  welding of republican and  libertarian rhetoric formed a 
powerful precedent for  the  political rhetoric of  both  business and 
municipal corporations in their dealings with state  governments. 
Despite their efforts  to  influence state  policy, corporate officers 
and  their friends increasingly found their views, interests, and  per- 
sonal political influence pushed aside in  the  rough and  tumble  of 
early  republic Pennsylvania politics. Accordingly, they  endeavored 
to  carve  out  an  economic realm—a corporate sphere—beyond the 
reach of grasping politicians and  hidden from  the  eyes  of a suspi- 
cious but  equally fickle  electorate.3 Corporate board members and 
the  city  councils worked to  make   their corporations independent 
from the state  government and  to create structures to administer pol- 
icies  among  corporations. The banks, for example, began  cooperating 
 
 
3.  This  is a formulation adapted from  Ju¨ rgen  Habermas’s consideration of the 
“public sphere” as defined in The  Structural Transformation of the Public  Sphere: 
An Inquiry into a Category  of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger  and  Freder- 
ick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.,  1989). 
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on  matters of money supply, effectively setting their own  policies 
for the  state  economy. Philadelphia’s corporate leaders also  decided 
which internal improvement projects they  would fund, setting re- 
gional  development policy. By having its  own  rules of conduct and 
membership and  being  in  many ways  shielded from  the  public, yet 
having influence over  economic and  political decision making, the 
corporate sphere became the  third arena of American life. 
That  the creation of the corporate sphere accelerated the centripe- 
tal and  centrifugal tendencies of American political economy became 
the   fatal   irony  of  the   republican  vision  of  America.  Expansion 
through space, republicans hoped, would forestall the  United States 
from evolving into  an industrial state  by keeping power locally struc- 
tured and  restraining the growth of cities, with their armies of depen- 
dent workers. To  spread across  the  land, however, people needed 
credit and  internal improvements to keep  their connections with ur- 
ban  and  overseas markets. Everyday farmers as well  as ambitious 
tradespeople did  help to break  the  power of their patron elites, but 
they  did  so at the  expense of falling under the  influence of the  even 
greater power of the  corporations that  controlled access to the  wider 
world. The  early  nineteenth-century phenomena of centralization, 
diffusion, and  decline of patron-client relations were  not  indepen- 
dent or contradictory events: they  were  the complementary effects  of 
the  rise  of corporations. 
Such effects  manifested themselves in  a variety of ways.  Lehigh 
Coal and  Navigation Company president Josiah  White could success- 
fully  exhort hundreds of men  who  depended on  the  company for a 
living to  sign  petitions to  the  Pennsylvania General Assembly sup- 
porting legislation that  favored the  corporation over  the  mill  owners 
who  previously ran  their counties. Furthermore, the  village  around 
which the  corporation’s mining operations centered, Mauch Chunk, 
grew exponentially but became a company town far more  oppressive 
than any  regime that  local  patrons might have  imagined. Manufac- 
turers in  Philadelphia’s northern suburbs exploited the  availability 
of water from  the  waterworks to run  their steam engines, while the 
city’s  government used regulations over  water distribution to bring 
suburban governments into  the  big city’s  orbit.  In addition, printers 
who  were  able to expand their businesses through bank  credit found 
themselves reluctant to  criticize banks lest  the  banks call  in  their 
loans. Corporate leaders created new  opportunities but  constrained 
others. 
In this  project I integrate the  scholarship of business, economic, 
and  legal  history, the  history of technology, and  the  history of the 
early  republic, positing insights made by no one  of these disciplines 
alone. Most  significantly, I argue  that  the  creation of the  corporate 
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sphere held serious consequences for  the  legacy   of  the  American 
Revolution. Philadelphia  corporations provided  broader political 
and  economic independence for many people; indeed, these compa- 
nies  grew because of the  great  demand for their services. They  spon- 
sored and  fostered great regional economic growth. Still,  as corporate 
insiders consolidated their hold over  institutions, they  gained com- 
mand over  the  direction of that  growth and  the  distribution of its 
rewards. Through consolidation of public power and  control of local 
infrastructures, Philadelphians made their city  a corporate capital. 
These phenomena, as much as any others, transformed America from 
a gentry-dominated society in  the  eighteenth century to  the  corpo- 
rate-dominated one  of the  nineteenth and  twentieth centuries. 
